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I. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
A. Status as a Consumer
HE emergence of a judicially created rule that extends liability under
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act
(DTPA) to a party who is "inextricably intertwined" in a transac-
tion is one of the more interesting developments in the DTPA caselaw. The
Texas Supreme Court's decision in Knight v. International Harvester Credit
Corp.2 originated this concept.
In Knight the plaintiff signed a retail installment contract for the purchase
of a truck. The contract contained a misrepresentation of the plaintiff's
rights under the law. The retailer assigned the contract to International
Harvester Credit Corporation (IHCC), which extended credit for the
purchase of the truck. The purchaser sued the retailer and IHCC alleging
that the misrepresentation was a deceptive trade practice. The defendants
prevailed in the trial court. The court of civil appeals affirmed and held that
the plaintiff was not a consumer as to IHCC because IHCC had merely ex-
tended credit and had not sold a good or service. 3 The Texas Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that the asserted misconduct involved more than a
mere extension of credit.4 The court recognized that the installment con-
tract was connected with the sale of a truck, which was clearly a "good." 5
Justice Pope, writing for the court, rejected the argument that the plaintiff
*B.A., J.D., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Bragg, Chumlea, McQuality,
Smithers & Curry, Austin, Texas. Adjunct Professor of Law, The University of Texas.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Melissa Krakauer, Attorney at Law, in
the preparation of this Article.
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987).
2. 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982).
3. 613 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981), aff'd in part & rev'd in part.
The DTPA defines a consumer as: an individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a
subdivision or agency of this state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or
services, except that the term does not include a business consumer that has assets of $25
million or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity with assets of $25
million or more. Id. See also Riverside Nat'l. Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex. 1980)
(mere extension of credit is not service).
4. 627 S.W.2d at 389.
5. Id. The DTPA defines goods as "tangible chattels or real property purchased or
leased for use". TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1) (Vernon 1987).
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was only a consumer as to the retailer who sold the truck and not to IHCC,
the assignee. 6 IHCC prepared the contract like most of the contracts that the
retailer used. The contract, in addition, bore IHCC's insignia, and even con-
tained a pre-printed clause assigning the contract to IHCC. The court con-
cluded that this contract evidenced a sufficiently close relationship between
the retailer and IHCC to charge both parties with equal responsibility for the
sale's conduct. 7 When stating this conclusion the court used the phrase "in-
extricably intertwined" to describe the degree of involvement in the transac-
tion by the nonseller sufficient to create equal responsibility for the conduct
of the sale.8 As a result the court held that the plaintiff was a consumer as to
IHCC who benefited from the sale.9
One year later, in Flenniken v. Longview Bank and Trust Co. 10 the Texas
Supreme Court relying on Knight held that a purchaser of home construc-
tion services had standing as a consumer to sue the lender who committed
an unconscionable act in its foreclosure on the property after the builder
abandoned the job.II The court dismissed the contention that the builder's
assignment of the purchaser's notes in exchange for construction financing
was a separate transaction from the original purchase of construction serv-
ices. 12 The court held that the plaintiffs were consumers as to the bank
which sought to enjoy the benefits of the plaintiffs' transaction with the
builder. 13
One can read Knight and Flenniken narrowly to limit the inextricably in-
tertwined doctrine as simply validating a plaintiff's standing as a consumer
by redefining as a single transaction what a traditional contractual privity
analysis would consider two separate transactions. According to this inter-
pretation, if in the course of this single transaction any party engages in
conduct prohibited by the DTPA, that party is amenable to an action under
the statute. At least one court of appeals adopted this limited approach and
held that the inextricably intertwined doctrine establishes only standing
under the DTPA and not liability of the intertwined party for the conduct of
another. 14 One can also read Knight broadly enough to support the view
that an inextricably close relationship between two defendants warrants
holding one defendant responsible for the other's misconduct.15 Under this
6. 627 S.W.2d at 389.
7. Id. Accordingly the court considered that the involvement between the plaintiff and
IHCC pertained to more than simply the extension of credit. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 661 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983).
11. Id. at 707.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Colonial Leasing Co. v. Kinerd, 733 S.W.2d 671, 673-674 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987,
writ granted) (inextricably intertwined relationship establishes only standing under DTPA; not
vicarious liability).
15. See Potere, Inc. v. National Realty Serv., Inc., 667 S.W.2d 252, 256-257 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (when two entities develop sufficiently extensive relation-




approach, when two defendants are interconnected in a transaction from
which they both benefit, a court would consider the actions of one defendant
as the actions of both.
The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Home Savings Association v.
Guerra,16 provided support for both views. In Guerra the lender was an
assignee of a home improvement contract and note. The court refused to
hold the lender liable for the misconduct of the contractor, noting that a
plaintiff must show that the defendant committed a deceptive act; a party's
innocent involvement in a transaction was not grounds for liability. 17 This
language is ammunition for the proponents of the "standing" theory.' 8 The
court went on to hold, however, that a creditor's liability is dependent on a
showing of either direct creditor involvement in the sales transaction or
some deceptive act relating to the financing. 19 Therefore, the plaintiff could
not recover against the lender because no evidence existed to show that the
lender was inextricably intertwined with the contractor and the plaintiff had
not advanced such a theory of recovery. 20 This portion of the court's opinion
implies that if the lender had had a close connection with the sales transac-
tion, the court would have imposed liability on the lender for misconduct of
the seller without a further showing of wrongdoing on the lender's part.
In Brown v. Galleria Area Ford, Inc.2 1 the plaintiffs took their vehicle to a
car dealership for repairs. While the car was still in the shop, the dealership
was sold. The plaintiffs sought to hold the successor dealership liable for the
previous dealership's faulty repairs on the theory that the two dealerships
were inextricably intertwined. The plaintiffs' standing as a consumer was
not an issue before the court. The court detailed the evidence that the con-
sumers advanced in support of its inextricably intertwined argument but
concluded that it was unnecessary to address the alternative theory of recov-
ery because the successor dealer had itself engaged in unconscionable
conduct. 22
In Qantel Business Systems, Inc. v. Custom Controls Co.23 the Texas
Supreme Court laid the issue to rest. Custom Controls, the purchaser of a
computer system, brought suit against the retailer and Qantel Business Sys-
tems, Inc. (Qantel), the manufacturer. The trial court directed a verdict for
Qantel on the grounds that Custom Controls presented no evidence that
Qantel engaged, directly or vicariously, in any wrongful or misleading act.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court on the
grounds that Custom Controls presented some evidence of a relationship
16. 733 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. 1987) (discussed at 42 Sw. L.J. 174 (1988)).
17. 733 S.W.2d at 136.
18. See Colonial Leasing, 733 S.W.2d at 675.
19. 733 S.W.2d at 136-37.
20. Id. at 137.
21. 752 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1988).
22. 752 S.W.2d at 115. The dissent disagreed with the court's conclusion as to the uncon-
scionable conduct and found it unnecessary to address the plaintiff's "alternative theory of
recovery" because the plaintiffs had waived the issue. 752 S.W.2d at 117 (Phillips, C.J.,
dissenting).
23. 761 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1988).
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that could provide a basis for liability.24 The Texas Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals decision because the lower court applied an improper
standard of review. 25 In the course of its opinion the court also rejected the
implication that the inextricably intertwined doctrine was a theory of vicari-
ous liability. 26 The court reaffirmed that the doctrine provided only a basis
for establishing a party's status as a consumer. 2 7 The court concluded that
the consumer may invoke the common law theories of vicarious liability
under the DPTA28 and therefore, the court had no need to expand deriva-
tive liability to parties who are inextricably intertwined. 29
In summary, the inextricably intertwined doctrine is a basis for disregard-
ing artificial barriers to standing which, in Justice Pope's words, "ignore the
realities of the transaction."' 30 The Texas Supreme Court's recent writings in
Guerra and Brown suggested that this doctrine was also be a basis for impos-
ing liability on a defendant, who benefits from the conduct of another party
with whom he has significant involvement in the transaction or over whom
he has a measure of control, for the misconduct of that party. 3 1 In Qantel,
however, the Texas Supreme Court rejected this expansive reading of the
doctrine and reaffirmed that the doctrine provides only a basis for establish-
ing standing and not vicarious liability.32
Texas courts have considered the status of a consumer in a variety of other
contexts during the Survey period. In Holland Mortgage and Investment
Corp. v. Bone 33 the question before the court was whether the purchasers of
a new home were consumers as to the lender that financed the purchase.
The court followed established law and looked to the purchasers' objective in
the transaction. 34 The court concluded that the purchasers' objective in bor-
rowing the money was to purchase goods and services involving home con-
struction. 3 5 The court also looked at evidence of a relationship between the
builder and lender. 36 The builder's agents had recommended the lender to
the buyers and had arranged the appointment. In addition the contract pro-
vided that the builder would have fulfilled his obligations upon the lender's
final inspection. Based upon the relationship between the lender and the
24. Custom Controls Co. v. MDS Qantel, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Qantel Business Sys., Inc. v. Custom Controls Co., 761
S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1988).
25. 761 S.W.2d at 303-05.
26. Id. at 305.
27. Id. The court ratified its statement in Guerra that liability does not attach to a defend-
ant based on his innocent involvement in a transaction. Id. See Home Sav. Ass'n. v. Guerra,
733 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. 1987); see also supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
28. 761 S.W.2d at 305.
29. Id.
30. Knight v. International. Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 389 (Tex. 1982).
31. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
33. 751 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
34. Id. at 517-18 (citing Knight v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382,
389 (Tex. 1982); Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex. 1983);
La Sara Grain v. First Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 558, 566 (Tex. 1984)).




builder and upon the plaintiffs' objective in borrowing the money the court
held that the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiffs were
consumers. 
37
In Texas Cookie Co. v. Hendricks & Peralta 38 the purchaser of a franchise
brought suit under the DTPA. The seller contended that a franchise was
intangible property and not a good or service and consequently, the pur-
chaser was not a consumer under the DTPA. The court of appeals rejected
this contention explaining that even the purchase of intangible property con-
fers standing if it is accompanied by the transfer of collateral services that
are also an objective of the transaction. 39 The court had no difficulty in
holding that the sale of the franchise included a host of qualifying collateral
goods and services. 4°
In 1983 the Texas Legislature amended the DTPA to exclude from the
definition of consumer those business consumers41 with assets of $25,000,000
or more and those business consumers that are owned or controlled by an
entity with $25,000,000 or more in assets.4 2 In Eckman v. Centenial Savings
Bank 43 the Texas Supreme Court established the rule for challenging a
plaintiff's standing as a consumer on the grounds that he falls within the
$25,000,000 exception." The defendant has the burden of objecting to the
plaintiff's standing and should specially except and obtain a hearing. Once
the issue is raised, the plaintiff has the burden of presenting evidence and
securing a determination that he does not fall within the exception.45 Unless
the defendant raises the issue, the plaintiff has no duty to establish the inap-
plicability of the exception.46
B. Liability Under the Act: Knowledge of the Defendant
In the DTPA the Texas Legislature declared twenty-three types of con-
duct as false, misleading or deceptive.47 This laundry list of proscribed con-
duct includes the non-disclosure of pertinent information by the seller for
the purpose of inducing the consumer into the transaction.48 Liability is
37. 751 S.W.2d at 518. The court correctly held that whether or not a plaintiff is a con-
sumer is a question of law for the court. Id. at 517.
38. 747 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
39. 747 S.W.2d at 876-877. The court noted that an intangible such as a franchise would
be worthless without the attendant collateral services. Id. Thus, the conveyance of one neces-
sarily entails the conveyance of the other. Id. As a result, a franchise is classified as a service
for the purposes of the DTPA. Id.
40. Id. at 877.
41. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(10) (Vernon 1987). Business consumers in-
clude individuals, partnerships or corporations, "who seek or acquire by purchase or lease, any
goods or services for commercial or business use." Id.
42. Id. § 17.45(4).
43. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 46 (Oct. 26, 1988).
44. Id. at 48-49.
45. Id.
46. Id. The Court noted that groundless special exceptions by the defendant are grounds
for sanctions. Id. at 49 n.l.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
47. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon 1987).
48. Id. § 17.46(b)(23). Subdivision 23 proscribes: "the failure to disclose information
concerning goods or services which was known at the time of the transaction if such failure to
1989]
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predicated upon non-disclosure of known information; a seller has no duty
to disclose information he does not know. 49
In Liptak v. Pensabene50 the court held that direct evidence of the seller's
knowledge is not necessary. 5' Instead circumstantial evidence and reason-
able inferences drawn therefrom are sufficient to justify a finding that the
seller knew but failed to disclose that the home sold to the plaintiffs was
infested with termites. 52 In Pfeiffer v. Ebby Halliday Real Estate,53 however,
the court held that this knowledge must be actual. 54 In Pfeiffer the court
held that common knowledge among realtors in the community that a par-
ticular house had foundation problems is no substitute for actual knowledge
on the part of the defendant real estate agent. 55 The court also held that
knowledge of prior foundation repairs does not imply knowledge of existing
foundation defects. 56
In Preston II Chrysler-Dodge v. Donworth 57 the plaintiffs claimed that the
defendant misrepresented the mileage on a used car they had purchased,
thereby representing that the vehicle was of a particular standard, quality, or
grade when it was of another. Prior to purchase, the defendant stated to the
buyers that the odometer reflected the vehicle's actual mileage.5 8 In fact, the
party who sold the vehicle to the defendant had rolled back the odometer.
The court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the defendant had
misrepresented the standard, quality or grade of the vehicle in violation of
DPTA. 59 The court held that the defendant's representation made to the
best of its knowledge was only false if made with knowledge of the inaccu-
rate mileage, and the plaintiffs presented no evidence of such knowledge. 60
disclose such information was intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which
the consumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed." Id.
49. Robinson v. Preston Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex. 1982); Wy-
att v. Petrila, 752 S.W.2d 683, 687 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
50. 736 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ).
51. Id. at 956-57.
52. Id. The court relied upon evidence that within two weeks of the sale termites were
swarming through the home and had created a mud tunnel on the ceiling, paneling had popped
loose, the ceiling in one room began sinking, the plaintiff's hands went through the wall when
she scrubbed it, the defendants who had been living in the home had painted the interior two
years earlier and the extent of the damage indicated the presence of termites from four to ten
years.
53. 747 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
54. Id. at 890.
55. Id.
56. Id. While the fact that a repaired foundation may not indicate the existence of a
current foundation defect, prior foundation repair is itself a material fact that the seller or his
agent should disclose since it will generally adversely impact the value of the home. See Brigh-
ton Homes, Inc. v. McAdams, 737 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1987,
no writ).
57. 744 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ granted).
58. Id. at 144. The court recited the defendant's representation as to the "best of its
knowledge the odometer reading stated on the vehicle was its actual mileage." Id. (emphasis
original).
59. Id. at 145; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(7) (Vernon 1987).
60. 744 S.W.2d at 145.
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C. Liability Under the Act: Warranty
In 1978, the Texas Supreme Court in Kamareth v. Bennett61 recognized
an implied warranty of habitability by the landlord in the lease of residential
property. 62 Ten years later, in Davidow v. Inwood North Professional
Group 63 a similar implied warranty was extended to the lease of commercial
property.64 In Davidow one tenant had a number of problems with the space
he leased including inadequate air conditioning, water leaks, and electrical
failures. When the problems remained unresolved, the tenant moved out of
the building and ceased making lease payments. The landlord sued for the
unpaid rent. The tenant asserted the defense of breach of an implied war-
ranty that the premises were fit for medical offices. The tenant prevailed in
the trial court but the court of appeals reversed. 65 The Texas Supreme
Court reversed that portion of the court of appeals decision that refused to
sustain the tenant's defense and held that (1) there is an implied warranty
that leased commercial premises are suitable for the intended purpose66 and
(2) the tenant's obligation to pay rent and the landlord's obligation under the
implied warranty were mutually dependent, making the landlord's breach of
warranty justification for non-performance by the tenant. 67 The court stated
that courts should consider a number of factors in determining whether the
landlord breached the warranty.68 Significantly, the court further held that
if the landlord and tenant expressly agree that the tenant will be responsible
for certain defects, that agreement will control.69
In Archibald v. Act III Arabians70 the question before the court was
whether the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance articu-
lated in Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes7 1 applied to horse train-
ing services. 72 In Melody Home the court held that there is a warranty
implied in law that the services of repairing or modifying existing goods or
61. 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978).
62. Id. at 661.
63. 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1988).
64. Id. at 376-77.
65. Inwood N. Professional Group v. Davidow, 731 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1987, rev'd in part & aff'd in part, 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1988).
66. 747 S.W.2d at 377. The court explained: "This warranty means that at the inception
of the lease there are no latent defects in the facilities that are vital to the use of the premises
for their intended commercial purpose and that these essential facilities will remain in a suita-
ble condition." Id.
67. 747 S.W.2d at 377.
68. Id.
The court stated that among the factors a court should consider are the nature
of the defect; its effect on the tenant's use of the premises; the length of time the
defect 'persisted; the age of the structure; the amount of the rent; the area in
which the premises are located; whether the tenant waived the defects; and
whether the defect resulted from any unusual or abnormal use by the tenant.
Id.
69. Id.
70. 755 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1988).
71. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987); see Curry, Commercial Torts and Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices, 42 Sw. L.J. 171, 178 (1988).
72. 755 S.W.2d. at 85.
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property will be performed in a good and workmanlike manner. 73 In a nar-
rowly written opinion, the majority in Archibald held that horse training
services fell within the Melody Homes warranty because the training resulted
in a modification of the abilities, traits, and value of a horse, an existing
tangible good.74 Failure to render those services in a good and workmanlike
manner exposed the trainer to liability for damages, in this case, for the
death of a horse.75
Two justices wrote separate dissenting opinions. 76 In his dissenting opin-
ion Justice Wallace, argued that since horse training services did not fall
within the ambit of the Melody Homes warranty and given the remedies
available to the plaintiff for breach of contract and negligence, he saw no
need to create a new implied warranty. 77 Justice Gonzales, in a separate
dissenting opinion, argued that the real issue before the court was whether
the court should extend an implied warranty of good and workmanlike per-
formance to professional services.78 Although reiterating the view, as ex-
pressed in Coulson v. Lake LBJ Municipal Utility District,7 9 that no
difference exists between the standards of care in a claim for breach of the
implied warranty and in a claim for negligence, Justice Gonzalez neverthe-
less considered it inappropriate to recognize an implied warranty in the ren-
dition of professional services.8 0 Instead, Justice Gonzales urged adherence
to the principle the court set forth in Dennis v. Allison 8 1 that no implied
warranty arose in the performance of professional services.8 2
In Forestpark Enterprises v. Culpepper8 3 a tenant of a shopping center
brought suit against the property manager. The tenant alleged that the
property manager breached an implied warranty that it would conduct the
management services in a good and workmanlike manner. Specifically, the
tenant complained that the manager breached the implied warranty by fail-
ing to evict a co-tenant whose business attracted undesirables whom the
court termed "ne'er-do-wells and ruffians" and drove off the plaintiff's pa-
trons. The court held that the management services in question qualified as
professional services, and therefore the court looked not to Melody Home
73. 741 S.W.2d at 353-54.
74. 755 S.W.2d at 86.
75. id.
76. Id. at 86 (Wallace, J., dissenting); Id. at 87 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Since Chief
Justice Phillips did not sit and Justice Culver joined Wallace's dissenting opinion the majority
opinion garnered only five votes.
77. Id. at 86-87.
78. Id. at 87.
79. 734 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987); Id. at 87. See Curry, supra note 71, at 177-78.
80. 755 S.W.2d at 88 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Justice Gonzalez chastised the majority
for extending a warranty imposing "strict liability" and "guaranteeing an error-free perform-
ance" yet later in the same opinion equated the standard of care required under the implied
warranty with that required "under the common law negligence doctrines." Id. at 86-87. Jus-
tice Gonzalez correctly noted, however, that a warranty action under the DTPA is governed
by "producing cause" while a negligence action is governed by "proximate cause". Id. at 88.
This fact, in his view, increased the potential liability of service providers.
81. 698 S.W.2d 94, 95-96 (Tex. 1985).
82. 755 S.W.2d at 88 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
83. 754 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
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but to Dennis v. Allison for the governing principle.84 Following the latter
case, the court held that no implied warranty existed. 85
D. Liability Under the Act: Unconscionability
In Brown v. Galleria Area Ford, Inc. 86 the Brown's took their damaged
truck to LaMarque Ford of Texas (LaMarque) for repair. While the vehicle
was in the repair shop, three individuals contracted to purchase the dealer-
ship. The purchasers assumed full managerial authority for the day-to-day
operations, but they remitted receipts from repair work already in progress
to LaMarque. Shortly thereafter they formed a corporation, Galleria Ford
(Galleria), and conducted all operations under that name. Upon return of
their vehicle the Browns found the repairs unsatisfactory and brought suit
against Galleria under the DTPA for the faulty repairs. The Browns pre-
vailed in the trial court. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed on the
basis of no evidence that Galleria had engaged in any misconduct that would
subject it to liability under the DTPA.87 The Texas Supreme Court reversed
and held that evidence presented at trial supported the jury findings that
Galleria had engaged in an unconscionable act or course of action.88 The
court examined the evidence in relation to both definitions of unconsciona-
bility in the DTPA.89 Unrebutted evidence established that the truck was
too dangerous to drive and that additional damage occurred during the re-
pair work. The court held such evidence established a gross disparity be-
tween the value received and the consideration paid, which violated DTPA
under the second half of the statutory definition. 90 The court also held that
Galleria by representing itself to the parties as the company in charge of the
dealership, took advantage of the Brown's lack of knowledge of the true
responsibility of the parties involved in the dealership to a grossly unfair
degree.91 As a result, the court held that Galleria also violated DTPA under
the first half of the statutory definition. 92 Finally, the court rejected Gal-
leria's contention that an agreement between LaMarque and itself that
LaMarque would be responsible for deceptive trade practices committed in
84. Id. at 779.
85. Id.
86. 752 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1988). This case also presents the issue of status. See supra
notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
87. Galleria Area Ford v. Brown, 748 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.],
rev'd, 752 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1988).
88. 752 S.W.2d at 116.
89. Id. The statute defines unconscionability as:
"Unconscionable action or course of action" means an act or practice which, to
a person's detriment: A. takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, expe-
rience or capacity of a person to a grossly unfair degree; or B. results in a gross
disparity between the value received and the consideration paid in a transaction
involving the transfer of consideration.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon 1987).
90. 752 S.W.2d at 116. "Gross disparity" is determined from the consumer's perspective.
The fact that Galleria had agreed with LaMarque that the latter would receive the proceeds of





Galleria's name relieved Galleria of liability. 93 Chief Justice Phillips, in his
dissenting opinion, argued that the record showed no evidence that any vio-
lation of the DTPA by Galleria was a producing cause of damages to the
consumers.94 Chief Justice Phillips found no nexus between the confusion as
to control of the dealership and the poor repair work as well as no evidence
that Galleria performed the repairs.95
In Kennemore v. Bennett9 6 Bennett agreed to build the Kennemores a
home. The Kennemores moved in upon completion, but refused to pay cer-
tain amounts that Bennett submitted on his bill because of alleged defects
and plan deviations. Bennett instituted an action on the contract and for
foreclosure. The Kennemores counterclaimed alleging that Bennett did not
build the home in a good and workmanlike manner and that Bennett en-
gaged in deceptive trade practices. The Kennemores ultimately paid the
amounts that Bennett demanded but nevertheless proceeded with their coun-
terclaim under the DTPA. The trial court directed a verdict against the
Kennemores and they appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment on the ground that the Kennemores' payment to Bennett
and possession of the home waived their claims and estopped them from
asserting them. 97 The Texas Supreme Court reversed and held that in the
absence of an express waiver or settlement, the consumers' payment for and
acceptance of allegedly defective performance did not constitute a waiver of
the DTPA claim.98 The court further held that Bennett's false assurances
that he would personally supervise the work coupled with his continued fail-
ure to do so or to correct the defects resulting from his subcontractor's work
constituted some evidence of a violation under the statutory definition.99
In Wyatt v. Petrila 100 a court of appeals held that the sale of a home on an
"as is" basis does not preclude a determination that the sale was unconscion-
able due to a gross disparity between the value received and the considera-
tion paid.' 0' The court reasoned that to permit this disclaimer to defeat a
claim of unconscionability would contravene the provision against waiver in
93. Id. at 116-17.
94. 752 S.W.2d at 117 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting). Incidentally, three other justices joined
in Phillips' dissent resulting in a 5-4 majority. Id. at 118 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 117-18 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
96. 755 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. 1988).
97. Kennemore v. Bennett, 740 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987), rev'd, 755 S.W.2d
89 (Tex. 1988).
98. 755 S.W.2d at 91. The court reasoned that the waiver and estoppel theories that the
lower courts advanced were applicable to contract actions, but were not controlling in this
statutory action under the DTPA. Id. See Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985);
see also Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980) (contractual defense of substantial
performance inapplicable to DTPA claims).
99. 755 S.W.2d at 92. This constituted, in the court's words, "some evidence that Bennett
took advantage of the Kennemores' lack of knowledge of the construction business and lack of
ability to correct the problems themselves". Id.; cf. Pfeiffer v. Ebby Halliday Real Estate, 747
S.W.2d 887 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ) (when defendant has no knowledge of founda-
tion defects in home and buyer receives same information as defendant, no evidence exists that
defendant took advantage of buyer's lack of knowledge to grossly unfair degree).
100. 752 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
101. Id. at 685-86.
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the DTPA. 10 2 The court nevertheless concluded that the $50,000.00 differ-
ential between the value received ($575,000.00) and the consideration paid
($625,000.00) did not constitute a gross disparity.10 3 Accordingly, the court
reversed the jury's finding of unconscionability.' °4
E. Damages
In Ludt v. McCollum 105 the Texas Supreme Court confirmed that any
residual loss of value in property after repairs is compensable under the
DTPA. 10 6 The court, however, refused to allow the plaintiff to recover both
repair costs and loss in value because the trial court submitted a question to
the jury that did not inquire as to the loss in value after repairs.' 0 7 The court
held that under these circumstances to have permitted recovery of both the
cost of repair and reduction in value would result in a double recovery.108
In WO. Bankston Nissan, Inc. v. Walters109 the plaintiff purchased a
pickup truck from W. 0. Bankston Nissan, Inc. (Nissan). As part of the
purchase price, Walters traded in his 280-ZX automobile at an agreed upon
value of $7,700.00. After experiencing mechanical problems with the truck
and upon learning that the truck was an older model than the year that
Nissan represented, Walters demanded rescission of the sale and the return
of his automobile. However, Nissan had already sold the 280-ZX. Walters
102. Id. at 685; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon 1987). The statute
provides in part that "[a]ny waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this subchapter is con-
trary to public policy and is unenforceable and void .... " The court also relied upon Weitzel
v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1985) in which the Texas Supreme Court held that an "as is"
clause was not a defense to a DTPA action based upon misrepresentation. 752 S.W.2d at 685.
103. 752 S.W.2d at 686. Cf Holland Mortgage and Inv. Corp. v. Bone, 751 S.W.2d 515,
521 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1987, no writ) (disparity of less than seven percent did
not constitute "gross disparity" as a matter of law).
104. 752 S.W.2d at 686.
105. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 50 (Oct. 26, 1988).
106. Id. at 51. In so holding, the court followed the decisions in Terminex International,
Inc. v. Lucci, 670 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Brighton
Homes, Inc. v. McAdams, 737 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), both of which approved recovery of reduction in value after repairs. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
at 51. In Brighton Homes the court further considered the question of the date upon which the
court should measure the amount of damages. 737 S.W.2d at 342-42. Brighton Homes, Inc.
(Brighton Home), the defendant, argued that the date the foundation failed determined the
date of repairs and reduction in value. The court rejected that contention because Brighton
Homes had warranted that they would repair latent defects and held that Brighton Homes'
failure to repair constituted a continuing cause of damage justifying an award of damages
measured at the time of trial. Id. Actually, regardless of the existence of a warranty of repair,
damages such as foundation and termite damages, can be progressive. Unlike a fire or colli-
sion, consumers usually cannot pinpoint a moment when the damage occurs. Given the con-
tinuing nature of the damages, courts properly measure the cost of repair at the time of trial.
If the consumer does elect to measure the damages from the date of sale or the date he discov-
ered the defect as opposed to the date of trial, courts should permit him to recover pre-judg-
ment interest on that amount. Until the Texas Supreme Court settles this issue, the best course
of action is to offer proof of the cost of repairs at all relevant times. In most cases, the differ-
ence is minimal.
107. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 51. The jury question permitted recovery of the "[p]ermanent
reduction in the market value at the present time of the home because of foundation problems
.... " Id.
108. Id.
109. 754 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. 1988).
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then brought suit seeking recovery of the fair market value of his automobile
on the date of the transaction. In the trial court the jury found for Walters,
but the court rendered judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal the
court of appeals reversed. 110 The Texas Supreme Court reversed and sus-
tained Nissan's contention that Walters failed to prove a compensable mea-
sure of damages. 1"I The court stated that Walters may recover his damages
with respect to the truck under either the out of pocket measure" 12 or the
benefit of the bargain measure,113 whichever afforded the greater recov-
ery. 1 4 The court also held that the value of the 280-ZX, which was the only
damage issue submitted, was not the proper measure of damages. 1 5 Justice
Mauzy, in his concurring opinion, noted that while one could appropriately
apply either the out of pocket or benefit of the bargain measures in this case,
they were not the exclusive measure of damages available in DTPA cases. " 6
In Jacobs v. Danny Darby Real Estate, Inc. '1 7 Jacobs purchased a tract of
land from the defendant and made improvements upon it on the basis of the
representation of the defendant that Jacobs was eligible for financing
through the Texas Veterans Land Board. Jacobs did not obtain the financ-
ing and he brought suit seeking to recover his out of pocket expenses in-
curred in improving the land. He prevailed in the trial court but the court of
appeals reversed and held that he had not offered evidence of the reasonable-
ness and necessity of his expenses.' 18 The Texas Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals.' ' 9 Despite the absence of specific testimony that the
expenses were reasonable and necessary, the court held that the evidence of
the materials and services purchased for the improvements, most of which
Jacobs did himself, supported the deemed finding that the expenses were
reasonable and necessary. ' 20 Finally, the court noted that the defendant did
not preserve the issue of whether a consumer must establish the reasonable-
ness and necessity of expenses in a DTPA action and the court did not need
110. Id.
111. Id. at 128.
112. Id. The court defined this measure as the "difference between the value of that which
was parted with and the value of that which was received" Id. (citing, among other cases,
Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex. 1984)).
113. 754 S.W.2d at 128. The court defined the measure as the "difference between the
value as represented and the value actually received" Id. (citing, among other cases, Leyen-
decker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex. 1984)).
114. 754 S.W.2d at 128.
115. Id.
116. 754 S.W.2d at 128-29 (Mauzy, J., concurring). See Vogelsang v. Reece Import Autos,
Inc., 745 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (when the services sought by consumer
are either not rendered or are worthless, consumer may recover amount paid); see also Kish v.
Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1985) (court permitted recovery of payments made on worth-
less pool without utilizing market value approach).
117. 750 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. 1988).
118. Danny Darby Real Estate, Inc. v. Jacobs, 740 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987),
rev'd, 750 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. 1988).
119. 750 S.W.2d at 176.
120. Id.; see also Liptak v. Pensabene, 736 S.W.2d 953, 958 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no
writ), (while "doubtless true" that party must establish repairs were necessary and costs were
reasonable, nevertheless, explicit testimony was not necessary).
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to express an opinion on the issue. 121 Justice Kilgarlin in his concurring
opinion argued the additional point that DPTA did not require proof of
reasonableness and necessity because the statute did not specify such
proof. 122
In Centroplex Ford, Inc. v. Kirby 123 the court held that under certain cir-
cumstances a consumer may recover damages for mental anguish under the
DTPA. 124 Traditionally, courts have permitted the recovery of these dam-
ages in DTPA cases upon a showing of either (1) a willful tort, a knowing
violation, willful or wanton disregard, gross negligence or (2) a resulting
physical injury. 125 In Kirby the court held that the jury finding of uncon-
scionability qualified as a finding of wanton misconduct entitling the plaintiff
to recover damages for mental anguish without further proof of physical
injury. 126 The Kirby court relied upon the Texas Supreme Court's decision
in St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard, 127 which abolished the requirement of
proof of physical injury in suits alleging a negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 128
In Sunrizon Homes, Inc. v. Fuller 129 the court dealt with the recovery of
additional statutory and exemplary damages under the DTPA.130 Because
the defendant failed to answer the trial court entered a default judgment.
The court held that for a plaintiff to recover additional statutory damages
under a default judgment the plaintiff must both plead knowing conduct and
121. 750 S.W.2d at 175 n.2.
122. Id. at 176 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring). But see Woo v. Great Southwestern Acceptance
Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.- Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Justice Kilgarlin
reasoned that the legisliture intentionally omitted an explicit requirement of reasonableness
and necessity as evidenced by language permitting recovery of "reasonable and necessary"
attorneys' fees. 750 S.W.2d at 176 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring). See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE.
ANN. § 17.15(d) (Vernon 1987). In Corum Management v. Aguayo Enterprises, 755 S.W.2d
895, 897, 898 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ), the court quoted at length from Justice
Kilgarlin's concurring opinion finding in it both "logic and substance". Id. at 897-98. How-
ever, the court found it unnecessary to address the issue because the evidence supported a jury
finding that expenses were reasonable and necessary. Id. As a practical matter, even if a
majority of the Texas Supreme Court agreed with Justice Kilgarlin on this issue, the outcome
should not necessarily change since the plaintiff must prove the defendant's conduct a produc-
ing cause of the plaintiff's damages. A defendant's conduct is not a producing cause of unnec-
essary expenditures. For example, repairs to a home which exceed those necessary to correct
the defect is caused not by the defendant's conduct but by the whim of the homeowner. Simi-
larly, the defendant's conduct will not cause the homeowner to pay an unreasonable amount
for the repairs.
123. 736 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
124. Id. at 264.
125. Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. 1984); Farmers &
Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1981); Duncan v. Luke Johnson
Ford, Inc. 603 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex. 1980).
126. 736 S.W.2d at 264.
127. 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987).
128. 736 S.W.2d at 264. The language rather than the express holding of St. Elizabeth
Hospital, supports this conclusion of the court of appeals. In that case, the Texas Supreme
Court stated that "the physical manifestation requirement is destined for extinction". 730
S.W.2d at 652 n.3. See also Kold-Serve v. Ward, 736 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1987, writ dism'd) (dicta: proof of physical injury not required to recover mental anguish
damages).
129. 747 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied).
130. Id. at 534-35.
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establish that the extent of the defendant's knowledge merits additional
damages. 131
F. Attorneys' Fees
The DTPA provides that a court shall award a consumer reasonable and
necessary attorneys' fees. 132 In Satellite Earth Stations East, Inc. v. Davis 133
the court held that an award of attorneys' fees is mandatory if a violation of
the DTPA is found. 134 The only question that remains for the trier of fact is
the amount of attorneys' fees. 135 The court modified the trial court's judg-
ment and properly awarded attorneys' fees to the consumer and not to the
consumer's attorney. 136
When a DTPA cause of action is combined with a nonstatutory claim, the
defendant often contends that the consumer's attorney must segregate those
attorneys' fees attributable to prosecuting the DTPA claim from those ac-
crued in connection with common law claims. In Texas Cookie Co. v. Hen-
dricks & Peralta, Inc.137 the court held that when the common law and
DTPA claims are more or less inseparable, that is, both involving proof of
the same facts, the attorney is not required to allocate the time spent on
each. 1
38
The defendant may recover attorneys' fees upon a showing that the plain-
tiff brought a groundless DTPA claim in bad faith or for the purpose of
harassment.' 39 Whether a suit is groundless is ordinarily a question for the
131. Id. at 534. The court stated that the defendant admitted knowing misconduct by the
default but nevertheless required that the plaintiff present evidence to establish the extent of
the knowledge. Id. While the court's reluctance to permit the award of substantial punitive
damages in a default context is understandable, it would seem that to require a showing of the
extent of the knowledge negates the effect of the admission of the knowing violation. Perhaps,
what the court meant is that it will look to all of the evidence including the evidence showing
knowledge when it reviews the amount of additional damages awarded.
132. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 1987).
133. 756 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, no writ).
134. Id. at 387.
135. Id.
136. Id. Accordingly, if the defendant is entitled to an offset against the consumer, he can
offset this amount against the award of attorneys' fees. Id.
137. 747 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
138. Id. at 880. In Concorde Limousines, Inc. v. Moloney Coachbuilders, Inc., 835 F.2d
541 (5th Cir. 1987), the court held that allocation is not necessary when there is a "substan-
tial", even though not complete, overlap in the causes of action. Id. at 546-48. The court also
held that paralegal time is recoverable as part of the attorneys' fees. Id. at 547 n.25.
139. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon 1987); see Preston II Chrysler-
Dodge, Inc. v. Donwerth, 744 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ granted).
Courts have interpreted this provision as allowing the recovery of attorneys' fees if the action
was brought in bad faith and was groundless or, if the action was simply brought to harass.
Leissner v. Schott, 668 S.W.2d 686, 686 (Tex. 1984); Shenandoah Assocs. v. J & K Properties,
Inc., 741 S.W.2d 470, 484 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied). But see Myer v. Splett-
stosser, 759 S.W. 2d 514, 517 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, writ pending) (finding of harassment
alone not enough). Although § 17.50(c) refers to a "finding by the court", a number of courts
have held that the jury decides questions of bad faith and harassment. Leissner, 668 S.W.2d at
686, (noting discrepancy between statutory language and court decisions); but cf Blizzard v.
National Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 801, 810 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ) (declined




court. 140 At least one court has held that the fact that a claim survives a
motion for directed verdict does not preclude a later determination that it
was groundless. 141
G. Defenses
In Ojeda de Toca v. Wise 142 the plaintiff purchased a home from the de-
fendant. The City of Houston had previously issued a demolition order for
the home and the city filed the order in the Harris County deed records prior
to the sale. The plaintiff was unaware of the demolition order, and the seller
who knew of the order neglected to tell her. The plaintiff left town, and the
city demolished the home while she was gone. The jury found that the de-
fendant's failure to disclose was a deceptive trade practice and fraud. The
court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the defendant on the
ground that the plaintiff had constructive knowledge of the demolition or-
der, which was a defense to her DTPA and fraud claims.143
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals.44 The court opined that the purpose of the recording statute was to
protect innocent purchasers from secret liens and encumbrances and not to
protect those who would perpetuate a fraud.145 Accordingly, the court held
that imputed notice under the recordation statutes was not a bar to liability
for fraud or deceptive trade practices.146 This holding is correct: the recor-
dation statute should not substitute for the disclosure of material facts of
which the seller has actual knowledge. 147
In Alvarado v. Bolton 148 Bolton agreed to convey certain land to Alva-
rado. The earnest money contracts contained language constituting an ex-
press warranty that Bolton would convey the mineral interests. The
warranty deeds, however, reserved the mineral interests and the jury found
the reservation in the deed to be a breach of the express warranty. The court
of appeals reversed and held that the doctrine of merger barred Alvarado's
claim for breach of warranty. 149 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals and held that merger is a common law defense that has no
140. Blizzard, 756 S.W.2d at 810; Howell v. Homecraft Land Dev., Inc., 749 S.W.2d 103,
111 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied).
141. Howell, 749 S.W.2d at 111; Zak v. Parks, 729 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
142. 748 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1988).
143. Houston Title Co. v. Ojedade Toca, 733 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987), rev'd, 748 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1988).
144. 748 S.W.2d at 451.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Curry, supra note 71, at 196-197 (1988).
148. 749 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1988).
149. Bolton v. Alarado, 714 S.W.2d 118, 123 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986), rev'd,
749 S.W.2d 47 (1988). The doctrine of merger provides that:
When a deed is delivered and accepted as performance of a contract to convey,
the contract is merged in the deed. Though the terms of the deed may vary
from those contained in the contract, still the deed must be looked to alone to
determine the rights of the parties.
749 S.W.2d at 48.
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application to a statutory action under the DTPA. 150
In a strong dissent, four justices argued that, as a matter of law, no breach
of warranty existed. ' 5' The dissent reasoned that under the merger doctrine
the deed extinguished the contractual warranty. 52 The merger doctrine
was, therefore, not asserted as a defense to the breach of warranty action,
but rather to negate the existence of a warranty. 153
In Willis v. Maverick 154 the Texas Supreme Court primarily focused on
the application of the statute of limitations 155 in a common law cause of
action for legal malpractice. The court held that the discovery rule was ap-
plicable to legal malpractice actions and that the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the claimant, exercising reasonable care and diligence,
discovers or should have discovered the facts that established his cause of
action.15 6 The court further held that since the discovery rule operates to
avoid the statute of limitations, the claimant has the burden of pleading and
proving when the operative facts were discovered or reasonably should have
been discovered. 157 Since the plaintiff had failed to request a proper issue
submitting the discovery rule, she was unable to avoid the defendant's limi-
tations defense. 15 8
In Willis the plaintiff also alleged a cause of action under the DTPA. The
court held that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the DTPA limi-
tations provision. 5 9 The court reasoned that DTPA by this provision "in-
corporates the discovery rule".' 6° The plaintiff's failure to request a
properly worded discovery issue in connection with her DTPA claim waived
her attempt to avoid the effect of limitations. 16' The court apparently mis-
construed the DTPA limitations provision. The DTPA limitations defense
150. 749 S.W.2d at 48; see Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980).
151. 749 S.W.2d at 48 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 49 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
153. Id. Since the DTPA does not create warranties but merely provides statutory reme-
dies for their breach, a warranty must arise independent of the act. La Sara Grain Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 1984). The dissent observed that had Alvarado alleged
that Bolton had misrepresented a fact, the doctrine of merger would not have prevented proof
of the misrepresentation. 749 S.W.2d 49 (Wallace, J., dissenting). Apparently, Alvarado's
cause of action would have received the support of the full court had he alleged that Bolton
misrepresented the character of the real property interests being conveyed.
154. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 569 (July 6, 1988).
155. The two-year statute of limitations applies to legal malpractice actions. TEx. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986). Under § 16.003, one must bring suit "not
later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues."
156. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 569.
157. Id. at 572.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 573. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.565 (Vernon 1987). Section 17.565
reads in part:
All actions brought under this subchapter must be commenced within two years
after the date on which the false, misleading or deceptive act or practice oc-
curred or within two years after the consumer discovered or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered the occurrence of the false, mislead-
ing or deceptive act or practice.
Id.




is keyed to the occurrence of the misconduct in question or discovery of such
occurrence. Thus, unlike the two year limitations statute governing com-
mon law malpractice actions, discovery of the occurrence, not the accrual of
the cause of action, is the benchmark for the beginning of the limitations'
timeline. A proper construction of this provision would require that the de-
fendant plead and prove that the consumer discovered the misconduct more
than two years prior to the initiation of the lawsuit just as he must plead and
prove in a negligence action that the cause of action occurred outside the
limitations period. To hold otherwise incorrectly shifts the burden of proof
with respect to the limitations defense to the consumer. 162 This is not the
liberal construction required by section 17.44 of the DTPA.1
63
In McClure v. Duggan 164 a federal district court considered the applicabil-
ity of a statute of frauds defense to a claim for misrepresentation under the
DTPA. In this summary judgment case the plaintiff, McClure, alleged that
Duggan agreed to sell him a race horse with the understanding that if the
horse did not pass a veterinarian's examination, McClure was under no obli-
gation to buy the animal. McClure alleged that Duggan subsequently mis-
represented that the horse would not pass the test, thereby deceiving
McClure into not purchasing the horse, which later won the Hollywood
Derby. The court rejected Duggan's defense of statute of frauds on the
ground that the statute of frauds did not apply to misrepresentations that
were factual rather than merely promissory.1 65 Since McClure alleged that
Duggan did more than just fail to perform a promise, his lawsuit was not
simply a breach of contract claim recast as a DTPA claim to avoid the stat-
ute of frauds. 166
In several cases decided during the Survey period the courts refused to
find that the consumer had waived his rights under the DTPA as urged by
the defendants. In Wyatt v. Petrila 167 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
held that an "as is" clause in a contract for the sale of a home did not waive
the consumer's right to claim that the sale was unconscionable due to a gross
disparity between the consideration paid and the value received. 168 In Ken-
nemore v. Bennett 169 the Texas Supreme Court held that in the absence of an
express settlement or express waiver, payment for and acceptance of alleg-
edly defective goods or services of the defendant does not, in and of itself,
waive the consumer's right to sue the defendant for damages resulting from
162. An assertion that limitations has not run because one discovered the misconduct less
than two years prior to filing suit is not an attempt to "suspend" or "void" the operation of
section 17.565. Rather it attempts to invoke that section and place the burden on the defend-
ant to show that the misconduct was discovered outside the limitations period, that is, to prove
a limitations defense.
163. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon 1987).
164. 674 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
165. Id. at 223-24. In so holding the court followed Lawson v. Commercial Credit Busi-
ness Loans, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
166. 674 F. Supp. at 224.
167. 752 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
168. Id. at 685. The court relied upon the no-waiver provision in § 17.42 of the DTPA.
169. 755 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. 1988).
19891
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the defective performance. 170 Similarly, in Poe v. Hutchins 71 the court held
that the DTPA prohibited the defendant from asserting that the plaintiff's
post contract conduct waived his claim under the DTPA.1 72 The court re-
jected the argument that the DTPA provision applied only to contractual
waivers. 173 Finally, in FDP Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 174 the
court held that a contractual limitation in a yellow page advertising contract
that purported to limit Southwestern Bell's liability to the amount paid for
the advertisement was ineffective under the DTPA. 175
In Dubow v. Dragon 176 the Dragons sold a home to the Dubows. After the
purchasers signed the contract they discovered problems with the home in-
cluding structural problems. They obtained expert reports that confirmed
the problems. The purchasers alleged that they confronted the sellers with
the problems and the sellers assured them that it was a good house with no
problems. Based upon the inspection and reports the parties modified the
contract to include language acknowledging the need for continuous mainte-
nance due to the site positioning, foundation, and drainage and to reduce the
sales price. In view of this evidence the court of appeals affirmed a summary
judgment for the defendants on the grounds that the alleged representations
that there were "no problems" did not produce damages to the buyers. 177
Obviously the buyers knew of the problems based upon their own inspection
and expert reports, had obtained a reduced price, and did not rely upon any
misrepresentations or failure to disclose on the part of the defendants. 178
H. Notice
A consumer must give thirty days written notice to the defendant of his
specific complaints and the actual damages, expenses, and attorneys' fees
claimed before filing suit seeking the recovery of damages under the
DTPA. 179 In Cielo Dorado Development, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp. 18 the
Texas Supreme Court considered the question of whether the consumer
properly showed notice. The defendant in Cielo pleaded that the plaintiff
failed to give the requisite notice. The plaintiff's attorney testified at trial
170. Id. at 91. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would discourage the resolution
of disputes; further, such a defense has no basis in the language of the DTPA. Id.
171. 737 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
172. Id. at 580; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon 1987).
173. 737 S.W.2d at 580.
174. 749 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
175. Id. at 571.
176. 746 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. App.- Dallas 1988, no writ).
177. Id. at 860.
178. Id.
179. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.505(a) (Vernon 1987). Section 17.505 states:
(a) As a prerequisite to filing a suit seeking damages under Subdivision (1) of
Subsection (b) of Section 17.50 of this subchapter against any person, a con-
sumer shall give written notice to the person at least 30 days before filing the suit
advising the person of the consumer's specific complaint and the amount of ac-
tual damages and expenses, including attorneys' fees, if any, reasonably incurred
by the consumer in asserting the claim against the defendant.
Id.
180. 744 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1988).
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that the plaintiff had mailed a demand letter as required by the DTPA. The
letter was not offered into evidence. No jury question concerning notice was
requested or submitted and no objection to its nonsubmission was lodged.
The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict. A major-
ity of the Texas Supreme Court held that, even assuming181 that proof of
notice was the plaintiff's burden, the defendant's failure to object to the non-
submission of notice was deemed to support the judgment pursuant to rule
278 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (TRCP).1 82 The plaintiff's attor-
ney's testimony, unobjected to by the defendant, constituted some evidence
of proper notice.18 3  The dissent asserted that it is unequivocally the con-
sumer's burden to prove proper notice. 18 4 To discharge this burden the con-
sumer must, in the dissent's view, prove that the notice was timely given, a
question of fact.185 Second, the consumer must establish that the notice was
legally sufficient, a question of law.1 86 The dissent argued that since this
latter question, is one of law, as opposed to fact, a court cannot deem that
the legal sufficiency requirement supports the judgment. 87 Finally, the dis-
sent argued that the testimony offered did not establish the sufficiency of the
notice. '88
The consumer avoids the necessity of proving proper notice when he
pleads notice and the defendant does not specifically deny that notice has
been given as required by rule 54 of TRCP.18 9 Since notice is only required
when the plaintiff files suit seeking damages under the DTPA, a party may
file an action not seeking DTPA damages and later give the requisite notice.
Thirty days after the plaintiff gives notice, he is free to amend his pleading to
allege entitlement to DTPA damages.1 90 In addition, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that when the original com-
plaint contains a DTPA claim, notice after suit is filed comes too late for a
new DTPA theory even though it was first alleged more than thirty days
181. The court emphasized that it was assuming that proof of notice was the consumer's
burden. Id. at 11.
182. 744 S.W.2d at 11. TEX. R. Civ. P. 278 provides in part:
Failure to submit an issue shall not be deemed a ground for reversal of the
judgment, unless its submission, in substantially correct wording, has been re-
quested in writing and tendered by the party complaining of the judgment; pro-
vided, however, that objection to such failure shall suffice in such respect if the
author is one relied upon by the opposing party.
Id.
183. 744 S.W.2d at 11.
184. Id. at 11-12 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). The DTPA supports this view in the language
of section. 17.505(a), which provides that notice is "a prerequisite to filing a suit." TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505(a) (Vernon 1987) (emphasis added).
185. 744 S.W.2d at 12 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 11-12.
189. Investors, Inc. v. Hadley, 738 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.- Austin 1987, writ denied).
190. See Miller v. Presswood, 743 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Tex. App.- Beaumont 1987, no writ).
The Miller court also confirmed that a defendant who contends that he was not given adequate
notice must object and request a plea in abatement. Id.; see The Moving Co. v. Whitten, 717
S.W.2d 117, 123 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1989]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
after the notice. 191
II. INSURANCE
This Survey period, like the last, included important cases dealing with
noncontractual first party claims against insurance companies. In Arnold v.
National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. 192 the Texas Supreme Court had
held that an insurance company owes a duty of good faith and fair dealing to
its insured. 193 In Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America194 the court held
that a worker's compensation carrier owes a duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing to an injured worker who asserts a claim for worker's compensation. 195
In so holding the court concluded that the same type of special relationship
exists between a worker and the carrier as exists between the insurer and
insured in other settings, and accordingly, protection of the worker justifies
recognition of this duty. 196 The court rejected the argument that the Work-
ers Compensation Act provided an exclusive remedy. 197 The court reasoned
that the exclusivity clause related only to damages for personal injuries in
the course and scope of employment, not to damages arising after the injury
that resulted from the relationship between the worker and the carrier. 198
The court held that to establish a breach of duty the worker must establish
(1) the absence of a reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment of the
benefits of the policy and (2) that the carrier knew or should have known
that there was not a reasonable basis for denying the claim or delaying pay-
ment of the claim. 199
Chief Justice Phillips dissented and asserted that the workers' compensa-
tion system provided a comprehensive statutory scheme controlling the rela-
tionship between the carrier and the employee.2°° Imposition of a common
law remedy was not justified in his opinion. 201 Finally, Chief Justice Phillips
found nothing in the allegations to indicate bad faith in this case. 20 2
In Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.203 the Texas
Supreme Court decided one of the most important cases under the Texas
191. Boyd Int'l Ltd. v. Honeywell, Inc., 837 F.2d 1312, 1314-16 (5th Cir. 1988).
192. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
193. Id. at 167.
194. 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988).
195. Id. at 212-13.
196. Id. As in Arnold the court found the insured depends on the insurer for benefits and
will not have immediate recourse if an arbitrary decision to deny a claim is made. 748 S.W.2d
at 212.
197. 748 S.W.2d at 214. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp.
1989). The statute provides: "the employees of a subscriber...shall have no right of action
against their employer ... for damages for personal injuries . I..." d
198. 748 S.W.2d at 214.
199. Id. at 213.
200. Id. at 215 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 217-18 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting). Justice Wallace filed a dissenting opinion
stating thatwhile he would not preclude a bad faith suit by an employee against a carrier, he
found that the allegations that the carriers had failed to pay the claim and had appealed to the
Industrial Accident Board did not constitute bad faith. Id. at 218 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
203. 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
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Insurance Code (Insurance Code). The Vails brought suit under the DTPA
alleging that Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Texas Farm)
had violated the Texas Insurance Code by unfairly denying the Vails' claim
under their fire insurance policy. 2°4 The trial court rendered judgment for
the Vails based upon jury findings that Texas Farm had failed to exercise
good faith in processing the claim. The court of appeal affirmed in part and
reversed in part. 20 5 The Texas Supreme Court, in a split decision, reversed
and rendered judgment for the Vails. 20 6
At the outset the court ruled that the DTPA incorporates the provisions
of the Insurance Code in its entirety.207 Accordingly, any relief available
pursuant to Insurance Code is available through the DTPA.208 Both provi-
sions permit recovery for unfair claims settlement practices.
The court also addressed the following alternative violations argued by the
Vails in support of the judgment:
(1) Violation of Section 4(a) of Board Order 18663 .209 This section prohib-
its those acts or practices defined by the Insurance Code or rules or regula-
tions promulgated thereto as unfair or deceptive. The court held that a
definition of unfair practices contained in article 21.21-2 section 2(d) of the
Insurance Code, referred to as the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act,
could form the basis for a cause of action under article 21.21 of the Insur-
ance Code and section 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA.210 The court thereby dis-
missed Texas Farm's argument that one cannot incorporate the definitional
section of article 21.21-2 into article 21.21 because article 21.21-2 does not
itself confer a private cause of action. 21 1 The court also rejected the argu-
ment that a plaintiff utilizing an article 21.21-2 definition must establish that
the defendant's conduct was committed with frequency; this is only a requi-
site in enforcement actions by the State Board of Insurance under article21.21-2 .2 12
(2) Violation of Section 4(b) of Board Order 18663 .213 This section prohib-
204. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(4) (Vernon 1987); TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
art 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1989).
205. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vail, 695 SW.2d 692 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989),
rev'd, 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
206. 754 S.W.2d at 137.
207. Id. at 132.
208. Id.
209. St. Bd. of Ins., 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.3 (West July 21, 1988).
210. 754 S.W.2d at 134.
211. Id. 133-34. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Gonzalez argued that the legislature did
not intend to create a private cause of action for unfair claims settlement practices as described
in article 21.21-2. Id. at 138. In his opinion, the legislature would have listed those practices
in the DTPA or article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. Id.
212. Id. at 134-35. The court reasoned that "frequency" was not part of the definition of
unfair settlement practices but rather was merely a requirement before the Insurance Board
would issue cease and desist orders. Id. at 134. The court also reaffirmed its decision in Chit-
sey v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1987) requiring proof of frequency to
establish a violation of Board Order 41454, St. Board of Ins., 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.203(West July 21, 1988). Id. at 134-135. In separate dissents, both Justice Gonzalez and Chief
Justice Phillips remained unpersuaded by the court's reasoning. The dissents argued that the
frequency rule articulated in Chitsey applied to article 21.21-2, as well. 754 S.W.2d at 138-39.
213. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.3.
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its acts or practices that the law determines are unfair or deceptive. The
court had decided in a prior opinion that a jury finding did not constitute a
determination by law. 214 In Vail the court held that the court's own deci-
sions did qualify as such a determination and specifically held that its opin-
ions in Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. ,215 and Aranda
v. Insurance Co. of North America216 constituted legal determinations that
an insurer's failure to exercise good faith was an unfair or deceptive act.217
Accordingly, the jury's finding that Texas Farm failed to exercise good faith
in the handling of the Vails' claim established a violation of Board Order
18663 section 4(b) as incorporated into article 21.21 of the Insurance Code
and was actionable under section 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA.218
(3) Violation of Section 17.46(a) of the DTPA .2 19 A violation of section
17.46 of the DTPA is actionable under article 21.21 section 16 of the Insur-
ance Code. Article 21.21 includes violations of subdivision (a) of 17.46
which is not available to a consumer in a direct action under the DTPA.220
The court held that the jury's finding that Texas Farm had failed to exercise
good faith in its handling of the Vails' claim qualified as a finding that Texas
Farm had engaged in a deceptive act or practice prohibited by section
17.46(a) of the DTPA. 221 The violation was actionable through article 21.21
of the Insurance Code and section 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA.222
On the issue of damages, the court held that when an insurer unfairly fails
to pay an insured's claim, the insured as a matter of law, recovers damages
of at least the amount of the policy benefits improperly withheld. 223 Auto-
matic treble damages were available under the Insurance Code, which the
DTPA incorporated, justifying treble damages in the Vails' action under
that provision.224
In Gulf States Underwriters of Louisiana Inc. v. Wilson 225 the court held
that an insurance company's actions, inconsistent with the clear meaning of
the insurance policy, were at most a simple breach of contract that could not
be a violation of the DTPA or the Insurance Code. 226 The court's holding
appears to be overbroad. Even though a simple breach of contract does not
214. Chitsey v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. 1987).
215. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
216. 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988).
217. 754 S.W.2d at 135. Chief Justice Phillips argued in his dissent that those opinions
established the duty of good faith and fair dealing and did not determine what constitutes a
deceptive act or practice Id. at 140.
218. Id. at 135.
219. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon 1987).
220. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 605 (Tex. App.- Tyler 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e).
221. 754 S.W.2d at 135-36. Chief Justice Phillips argued in his dissent that the jury's find-
ing did not establish a violation of § 17.46(a). Justice Phillips would require an additional
finding that the failure to exercise good faith was deceptive. Id. at 140.
222. Id. at 136.
223. 754 S.W.2d at 136-37.
224. 754 S.W.2d at 137. The court also held that prejudgment interest may not be awarded
on the treble damages. Id.
225. 753 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
226. Id. at 430.
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establish a statutory violation, if the conduct constituting the breach also
constitutes a misrepresentation or unfair settlement practice, then one has
clearly established a statutory cause of action.227
In Street v. Honorable Second Court of Appeals228 the Texas Supreme
Court clarified the time frame during which an insured may institute a Stow-
ers action.229 The court had previously held that a Stowers cause of action
does not accrue until the judgment obtained against the insured becomes
final. 230 In Street the court held that a judgment becomes final, even if ap-
pealed, if a court does not supersede execution of the judgment.231 Never-
theless, the statute of limitations in a Stowers action will not begin to run
until one exhausts the appeals process regardless of whether a court super-
sedes the judgment.232 In Nash v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. 233 the
court held that the statute of limitations for claims under the DTPA and
Insurance Code complaining of an insurance carrier's refusal to defend be-
gins to run on the date of the refusal. 234
III. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE AND BUSINESS DISPARAGEMENT
In Champion v. Wright 235 the court faced a suit for tortious interference
with a contractual and business relationship. Wright and Berkes were part-
ners in a records retrieval company, ARS. Berkes was also an employee of
the partnership in charge of the San Antonio office. The defendants induced
Berkes to leave ARS and form a similar retrieval company. Wright brought
suit against the defendants for interference with the contractual and business
relationship between ARS and Berkes and obtained favorable jury findings.
The court of appeals sustained the plaintiff's recovery and held that Texas
recognizes a cause of action for tortious interference with both existing con-
tractual and prospective business relationships. 236 The court noted that
while the elements of the two causes of action are substantially the same,
tortious interference with a business relationship encompasses all intentional
interference with a contractual relationship regardless of whether a breach of
contract actually occurs. 237 Therefore the trial court did not need to inquire
227. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988); Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Marshall, 724 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1987).
228. 756 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1988).
229. A Stowers action is one instituted pursuant to G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Ameri-
can Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holdings approved), wherein the
court recognized an insured's cause of action against his liability insurer for negligent failure to
settle a claim filed against the insured by a third party.
230. Linkenhoger v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 152 Tex. 534, 260 S.W.2d 884, 887
(Tex. 1953).
231. 756 S.W.2d at 301.
232. Id. at 302.
233. 741 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied).
234. Id. at 600-01.
235. 740 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ denied).
236. Id. at 853.
237. Id. "The essential elements of a claim for tortious interference with an existing con-
tract are: (1) a contract existing that was subject to interference; (2) the act of interference was
willful and intentional; (3) such intentional act was a proximate cause of plaintiff's damages,
and (4) actual damages or loss occurred." Id.
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into whether there had been a breach. 238 The court further clarified that
tortious interference may embrace a contract terminable at will.239 Finally,
although interference with business relations requires a finding of malice, a
special issue that inquires whether the interfering party had actual knowl-
edge of the contractual or business relationship and still overreached, may
suffice to prove malicious interference. 24°
In a later case, the San Antonio court of appeals noted that not all inter-
ferences with contractual relations are tortious in nature.241 When a party
exercises its own rights or has an interest that is equal or superior to that of
the plaintiff's, privileged interference may result. 242 Thus, where a consult-
ing engineer employed by the city to oversee a project rejected work that did
not meet contract specifications, he did not act with malicious intent and did
not tortiously interfere with contractual relations by recommending that the
city fire the contractor handling the project. 241
In Maynard v. Caballero244 the court again considered whether interfer-
ence with a contract was privileged or justified. In this case an attorney for
one defendant in a multi-defendant criminal action was entitled to privilege
with respect to a claim by one of the other defendants and therefore had not
interfered with that defendant's own attorney-client contract. 245 A tortious
interference suit should not result when an attorney not in privity with other
litigants merely discusses joint defenses and strategies with the other liti-
gants' attorneys.246
Finally, in Magcobar North American v. Grasso Oilfield Services, Inc. 247
the court held that in an action for tortious interference a third party may
not use as a defense the unenforceability of a contract. 248 Thus, a claim for
tortious interference may succeed even though an underlying claim for con-
tractual damages fails. 249
IV. FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
The courts have held, as a general rule, that a cause of action for fraud
grounded upon the defendant's failure to perform a promise requires proof
that the defendant did not intend to perform the promise at the time it was
made.25 0 In Hebisen v. Nassau Development Co.2 5 1 the court held that the
238. Id. at 854.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 855.
241. Victor M. Solis Underground Util. & Paving Co., Inc. v. City of Laredo, 751 S.W.2d
532, 535 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. 752 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, writ denied).
245. Id. at 721.
246. Id.
247. 736 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ dism'd).
248. Id. at 801.
249. Id.
250. See Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. 1986.); Dowling v.
NADW Mktg., Inc., 631 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex. 1982).
251. 754 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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requisite intent may be established by circumstantial evidence, including acts
before and after the promise was made.252 The court enumerated the follow-
ing factors as relevant: (1) circumstances under which the promise was
made; (2) the relationship between parties; (3) their individual interests; (4)
the nature of the transaction; (5) the failure to perform; and (6) the efforts to
perform. 253 The court held that evidence of the defendant lessee's failure to
make the rental escalation payments as promised and denial of any obliga-
tion to make them, coupled with the absence of any testimony that they ever
intended to make the payments, supported a jury's finding of an intent not to
perform the promise. 25
4
In Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Marketing Inc. 255 the court faced
an unusual case of accountant liability for negligent misrepresentation. In
Greenstein a partner in the defendant accounting firm had recommended to
the plaintiff, its client, that it hire Norman Dunham as its comptroller. Prior
to becoming comptroller Dunham was a certified public accountant in the
defendant accounting firm. Dunham substantially misstated the plaintiff
company's financial condition, ultimately resulting in the company going
bankrupt. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had negligently misrepre-
sented Dunham's competence as an accountant, causing plaintiff to hire
Dunham. The jury found negligent misrepresentation, as alleged. 256 The
court of appeals affirmed recovery for the plaintiff under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,257 which imposes liability for negligent misrepresenta-
tions made by professionals, among others. 258 The court held that evidence
that another of the defendant's clients made a prior complaint that Dunham
was incompetent supported the conclusion that the defendant knew or
should have known that Dunham's competence was questionable. 259
252. Id. at 347.
253. Id. at 347-48.
254. Id. at 348.
255. 744 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ denied).
256. The jury also found that the defendant was negligent in the audits the defendant per-
formed during the period that Dunham was comptroller.
257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977). Section 552(1) reads as follows:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information,
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicat-
ing the information.
Id.
258. 744 S.W.2d at 189. In connection with the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence in
failing to perform its audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, the
court held, in a decision of first impression, that "the contributory negligence of the client is a
defense only where it has contributed to the accountant's failure to perform the contract and to
report the truth." Id. at 190 (quoting Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 345 N.W.2d
300, 307 (Neb. 1984)) (emphasis omitted).




In Intermarkets US.A., Inc. v. C-E Natco,260 the plaintiff sold a steam
generator to the defendant. To pay for the generator, the defendant assigned
the proceeds of a letter of credit issued by a third party. The defendant
received the proceeds of a successor letter of credit but failed to pay these to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought suit alleging, among other causes of ac-
tion, conversion. The court of appeals upheld the jury's findings that the
proceeds of the letter of credit constituted a specific identifiable sum of
money and that the wrongful retention of the money gave rise to a cause of
action for conversion. 26
1
In Security State Bank v. Valley Wide Electric Supply Co., Inc. 262 a sub-
contractor, Sweeney, contracted to purchase materials for a construction
project from a supplier, Valley Wide. The defendant made a loan to Swee-
ney, secured by an assignment of Sweeney's contract with the general con-
tractor. The bank instructed Valley Wide to submit its invoices with the
understanding that the bank would pay Valley Wide from the money paid by
the general contractor to Sweeney's account. The bank did not pay Valley
Wide but rather applied the money received from the general contractor to
Sweeney's debt to the bank. On appeal the bank argued that the failure to
pay Valley Wide did not constitute conversion because the funds were not
specifically identified. The court of appeals rejected this argument reasoning
that the money had been designated for a particular use and qualified as
specific money.263 The court held further that the bank, in accepting the
money with knowledge of its specific purpose, held the money in trust. The
bank then converted the money when it applied the money to reduce Swee-
ney's debt to the bank, in violation of the trust.264
260. 749 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. App.-Houston fist Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
261. Id. at 604.
262. 752 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
263. Id. at 664-65. The bank argued that it was impossible to determine what portion of
the general contractor's checks were intended for Valley Wide. The court held that a bank has
a duty to segregate funds in a mixed account before applying any portion to cover overdrafts.
Id. at 665.
264. Id.
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